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SHOULD WE BE MERCIFUL TO THE MERCILESS—
MERCY IN SENTENCING
Doron Menashe*
ABSTRACT
The aim of this Article is to present a normative argument for mercy as a
legitimate consideration in judicial proceedings, defining it as a distinct and
independent element not encompassed by normal concerns of justice, retribution
and individuation of sentencing.
The Article addresses two meanings of mercy in the judicial context, both of
which have—in the view of the author—a rightful part in the process of judgment
and sentencing. These are “mercy” in the weak sense, i.e., a deliberative state
of mind which accompanies the judicial proceedings (“Lesser Mercy”), and
“mercy” in the strong sense, i.e., the judicial prerogative of taking into account,
under appropriate circumstances, mercy towards the defendant once convicted,
as a deviation from strict retribution (“Greater Mercy”).
The Article presents the different approaches one may find in academic
literature pertaining to the validity of considering mercy in court, and the
relationship between justice and mercy.
The Article begins with the basic moral intuition as to the merit of mercy.
From this point of departure, the Article deals with the various criticisms raised
against the legitimacy of considering mercy in the judicial context. In the
normative analysis, the Article points to the need of formal justice to
accommodate the particularistic circumstances of every incident. Although
some have argued that this function should be met by equity, the Article argues
that mercy is better suited because rational-analytical considerations may prove
insufficient in this context.
The Article also argues that the judge’s prerogative to determine under
which circumstances to employ mercy towards the defendant does not contradict
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the responsibility and duty of the judge to impartiality. On the contrary,
mercy lives harmoniously with and epitomizes the social values that every
judge should represent.
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INTRODUCTION
It appears that there is no better point in which to discuss the concept of
mercy, its definition, its moral and social purpose, and its limits, than when a
judge determines the fate of a defendant. Ironically, legal scholars seem to shun
any debate or discussion on mercy’s role in the courthouse setting. This is no
accident. At sentencing, the judge’s discretion may be quite broad, and there is
a perpetual tension between the judicial system’s tendency to present the
verdict’s result as a “correct” and “just” legal decision; a product of objective
analysis; and a consequence of calculated discretion which emerges from the
rule of law, on one hand, and the fact that, the work of sentencing is profoundly
human, sensitive work based on particular considerations and subjective
impressions on the other.1 The yearning for a strict formalization of punishment
criteria2 as a tool for reaching certainty and legitimacy in legal decisions
1
For an analysis, see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 405–07 (Antheum 1966) (1949). This tension
is found in the writings of both Plato and Aristotle. In his earlier writings, Plato describes the ideal state as one
in which those with superior intellect rule on the basis of rationalism. Under this perspective, differences between
people and acts do not allow for the adoption of a simple universal law. Thus, he concludes that the law alone
cannot determine the most proper response. In his latter writings, Plato reaches the conclusion that this ideal is
not pragmatic, and so he moves to the opposing extreme: Rule by government based on irrevocable, unchanging
laws. Aristotle, on the other hand, defies the strict dichotomy of governing by intellect and governing by
inflexible laws. Aristotle claims that the tension may be resolved by leaving the application of general laws to
specific circumstances in the hands of judges or other appointees. Id.
In terms of the solution that Aristotle suggests, as expressed in the Anglo-American legal tradition, the
constant tension between Plato’s two diametrically opposed views remains. Jerome Frank, a supporter of legal
realism, writes of the “irrepressible human need for considerable personalization of justice.” Id. at 409. His
suggestion is to avoid, as much as possible, creating laws with the illusion of negating judicial discretion. Id. He
quotes George Alger: “The question is this: How long will it be before the pendulum will swing to the other
extreme—the demand for personal justice administered by the good man as a substitute for our endless barren
wilderness of precedents in law and a maze of indigestible statutes? The final hope for democracy must be, not
in its letter law, but in its leadership.” Id. at 408.
2
See e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Adopted as a result
of the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the guidelines were
intended to put to rest widespread criticism of sentencing disparities in the U.S. judicial system by providing for
more consistent and determinate sentencing; as opposed to indeterminate sentencing, whereby the ultimate word
on time served would more generally fall on a parole commission, the guidelines abolished parole for federal
offenses. Id. Drawing on case-law and existing state guidelines, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines sought to
codify sentencing criteria already in use by state judiciaries by regulating the consideration of offense levels,
criminal history and sentencing zones, inter alia, as well as mitigating factors and criteria for leniency. Id. at Ch.
1, pt. A. It is noteworthy, for the purposes of this Article, that the Guidelines were ruled unconstitutional under
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in United States v. Booker and succeeding cases, which determined that
binding federal judges to such criteria violated the Sixth Amendment’s guaranteed right to a trial by jury. 543
U.S. 220 (2005); AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2
(2011), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf.. As a result, while
federal judges are still required to consider the dictates of the Guidelines when sentencing, they are not
considered to be bound by them in issuing their rulings. Id. Similar attempts to codify sentencing criteria can be
seen in other countries, see generally, The Goldberg Committee Report issued in Israel (the Committee for
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challenges the ideal of flexible and sensitive human judgment which does not
emerge from mathematical generalizations.3
This tension between the yearning for equality in sentencing and leaving a
necessary place for particularistic considerations in the verdict exists even when
one’s sole objective is the realization of justice. It becomes even stronger when
one evokes the concept of mercy, which appeals to emotion and may have
subjective understandings and applications. Even if it is not explicit, the struggle
with the question of mercy’s place in the process of justice is certainly relevant.4
The concept of mercy in the judicial context is described in the legal
literature as a weakness, a display of sentimentality where distant rationality is
required, or an indulgence when a fitting penalty is required. The judge is seen
as shrugging off his social responsibility and authority in order to employ
dangerous arbitrariness, or perhaps even a subversive deviation from the sublime
realization of justice. Thus, it is a defect in justice.5 Critics note that mercy has
no role in criminal cases, because in the best-case scenario, the particularistic
circumstances of the act or the defendant are subsumed under the heading of
“justice,” so that there is naturally no need to resort to “mercy” as a valuable
consideration of independent significance. If incorporating mercy leads the court
to a less severe result than that required by law and justice, it is indefensible.6
There are those who go quite far in condemning mercy in the context of criminal
punishment: “Let them keep their [private] sentimentality to themselves for use
in their private lives with their families and pets.”7
However, such a negative and dismissive view of mercy is interpreted by
many, in a deep and intuitive way, as a deficient and simplistic solution.
Examining the Assemblage of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing–Reckoning (Jerusalem, Tishrei 5758–October
1997), wherein limitations were established for proportionate sentencing, and origin and aggravating
components were defined for specific crimes by a designated committee. Daniel Ohana, Sentencing Reform in
Israel: The Goldberg Committee Report, 32 ISR. L.REV. 591, 626–28 (1998).
3
The structural nature of judicial discretion in sentencing is beyond the scope of this Article For a
description of the structural nature of judicial discretion in sentencing, see e.g., HAIM COHEN, HAMISHPAT
(1992).
4
See Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1415–16, 1421 (2003–
2004). Weisberg explains that “[l]egal systems implicitly struggle with these questions rather than explicitly
answering them.” Id. at 1415–16. He states that “[i]t is possible to study a legal system by observing how it
agonizes over the relationship of justice to mercy, or how it consciously or unconsciously rationalizes the
relationship between the two, or how it exploits the inherent tension between them for instrumental purposes”
Id. at 1421.
5
See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, 162 (1988); cf. Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004).
6
Id. at 174.
7
Id. (emphasis added).
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Generally, those who embrace the concept of morality see mercy as a positive
human trait, certainly in the abstract.8 Turning mercy from virtue to vice in the
context of criminal justice, in which the individual is affected drastically and
fatefully, is not self-evident, and it raises a line of conceptual and moral
questions. Indeed, the tension between justice and mercy is a subject dealt with
by philosophers, authors, playwrights, and thinkers, religious and secular alike.
It is perhaps ironic that in law, where the ultimate realization of this dilemma
manifests, we see the most hesitation to directly address it. Other than in certain
outlying cases, the discussion of mercy in law tends to revolve around two main
approaches: 1) a skeptical, dubious approach to the role of mercy in judicial
proceedings; and 2) attempts to resolve the tension between these concepts by
proposing that legitimate considerations of mercy are already incorporated into
other concepts, such as the concept of justice, and that therefore mercy can be
reduced to these concepts.9 While thinkers debate and struggle, the legal
community for the most part avoids engaging in open, frontal contention with
this important dilemma, the silence is deafening.
This Article will argue mercy is integral to criminal justice and punishment.
This Article will examine two conceptual perceptions of mercy: mercy in the
“weak sense,” being a deliberative state of mind which accompanies judicial
proceedings; and mercy in the “strong sense,” being a judicial prerogative for
committing an act of grace towards the convicted party independent of the
principle of retribution. In fact, there is nothing preventing the court from
accounting for considerations of mercy in judicial proceedings, and courts that
adopt such an approach do so well within their authority.
In arguing for mercy in the weak sense, this Article will point to the fact that
this state of mind—regarded as an effort to view the proceeding through the eyes
of the defendant and to understand their position—is a matter of necessity in the
criminal justice system. It is essential precisely because of the wide discretion
granted to the court, and the relatively weak determinacy of legal rules. Since
the court cannot be fully guided as to the appropriate result by mere analysis and
the application of rules, the court must be instructed as to the appropriate state
of mind required for reaching a decision.
As for Greater Mercy, this prerogative does not contradict the responsibility
and the mission of the court. Instead, Greater Mercy both merges with and is
derived from these principles. Mercy in this strong sense is a moral consideration
8
9

“[M]ercy seems to be, in the abstract, an undeniable virtue.” Weisberg, supra note 4, at 1417.
See “Conceptual argument,” and the references there infra Section III.B.
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that on the one hand does not undermine justice, while, on the other hand,
preserves its independent agency and cannot be fully incorporated into the
concept of justice. Indeed, this Article recognizes that taking into account certain
types of circumstances as grounds for lenience on the basis of Greater Mercy
often constitutes only an intermediate stage of the process that is prior to the
judicial process’s formal recognition of the relevance of all circumstances
pertaining to substantive justice. However, it is our view that there are strong
reasons to see the terms “justice” and “retribution”—when used in the judicial
discourse as referring to formal justice—as distinct from substantive justice.
Mercy is therefore needed as a complementary consideration to bridge the gulf
between formal and substantive justice, even if one subscribes to the view that
substantive justice exhausts all the morally relevant considerations of
punishment.
Following the recognition of the legitimacy of mercy’s considerations, this
Article will advocate for an open and explicit legal discourse as to the place of
mercy in the judicial process. This discourse should be aimed at developing a
comprehensive normative and conceptual foundation for mercy in the legal
process, beyond the lines of thought included herein. This should be an open and
independent discussion. There is no reason to scorn considerations of mercy as
if they were somehow inappropriate or illegitimate.
The argument posed herein will be structured as follows: in Section I, this
Article will present conceptual distinctions between Greater Mercy and mercy
in the weak sense. In Section II, this Article will review the relevant academic
literature. Section III will be dedicated to normative law and addressing the
critics of the independent status of mercy in judging and sentencing.
I.

CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS OF MERCY

A. General Definition of Terms
Conceptually, “mercy” may have several different meanings. It relates to a
wider family of concepts, including love, grace, compassion, forgiveness,
charity, generosity and the like.
The common denominator of these concepts is a difficulty to define them in
deontological terms as a perfect duty though they may be laudable.10 They do
not support correlative rights. In Aristotelian terms, they cannot be included in
10
Some have suggested viewing it as an imperfect duty. See George Rainbolt, Mercy: In Defense of
Caprice, 31 NOÛS 226, 231 (1997).
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the concept of justice (whether corrective or distributive). These characteristics
create a tension between these concepts and those that have a clear deontological
status such as justice. This tension is exacerbated in interactions between the
state and the citizen, wherein the judge acts as a representative of the public. In
this institutional context, does the judge have any right to show mercy in the
name of the people, and, perhaps, even at their expense? What is the moral value
of mercy granted in this way?
However, the mere existence of such tension—which raises difficult
questions that will be addressed below—does not negate, in and of itself, the
positive elements of these “imperfect” virtues and their power for good in the
judicial context.
The focus of this work relates to mercy, the product of human empathy and
compassion towards others in their distress, as opposed to pity which entails an
expression of superiority over the weak.11 That being said, this Article will not
actively distinguish between mercy and other similar concepts such as grace or
compassion, since this distinction is irrelevant to this thesis concerning the
legitimacy of mercy in the judicial process.12
Instead, this Article will concentrate on the two senses of mercy, which are
employed daily in the courthouse, whether openly or inexplicitly. Though there
is a connection between these two senses of mercy, each is based on a different
expression of the judge’s duty. The first sense relates to the state of mind the
judge must seek to adopt, if only for a moment, while listening to the arguments
about the defendant—an internal, almost spiritual endeavor. The second sense,
on the other hand, assumes that the judge has the residual prerogative to take
certain actions.
Below, this Article will sharpen the distinction between these two senses of
mercy in the context of criminal jurisprudence and will clarify the scope of
mercy using various conceptual distinctions.
B. Mercy in the Weak Sense (“Lesser Mercy”)
As noted above, the first sense of mercy examined here is mercy in the weak
sense. The essential characteristic of this definition is that mercy cannot be
11

See discussion of pride infra Section III.J.
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev distinguishes between pity, compassion and mercy. AARON BEN-ZE’EV, THE
SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 333 (MIT Press 2000). The first two involve sympathy for the other who is suffering,
while mercy is defined as preventing the other’s suffering even when one has justification not to do so. Id. at
327–28.
12
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judged by parameters of action or result. A priori, this does not suggest leniency,
and its adoption in a certain case does not lead necessarily to a light sentence.
This sense is based on the sober understanding of judgment and sentencing as a
humane, delicate and complex labor. This process requires the ability to consider
the defendant as a person to be understood, because the question of whether a
specific circumstance falls within certain legal parameters is not merely an
intellectual endeavor; it also requires a specific state of mind.
As clarified below, even at the stage preceding the verdict, mercy in the weak
sense has its place. One may term this a “mercy-like” state of mind, since there
is reason to assign a separate name to the stage preceding the verdict. In this
stage, mercy in the weak sense entails a degree of empathy, and an
understanding of the criminal proceedings’ ramifications for the defendant. In
sentencing, Lesser Mercy reflects a predisposition to express a certain approach
towards the defendant that allows the act of judgement and sentencing to be
influenced by thoughts, presumptions and emotions of a certain type.13 This
perspective seeks to guarantee that one will form a more complete and humane
contemplation of the situation and the offender before they take punitive action.
A similar conception of mercy is proposed in the literature:
In a sentencer’s process of selecting a sentence from within a range of
authorized punishments, mercy is a frame of mind induced by the
imaginative effort to see both the impact of the possible sentences and
the nature of the criminal conduct from the defendant’s perspective.14

This merciful approach towards the convicted criminal in proper judicial
proceedings is dependent on the ability to express empathy while recognizing
the offender’s accountability.15 This empathy requires careful analysis of
multiple viewpoints: the suffering awaiting the offender and their family
members, the entirety of the circumstances under which they committed the
crime, and the subjective significance of the punishment from the offender’s
standpoint. Often, these considerations are ignored in the pursuit of justice, thus
justifying the introduction of an additional perspective: that of mercy, which
fulfills an external, complementary function, in the hopes of guaranteeing
moderation and balance.

13

See Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 288, 316

(1993).
14
Id. at 329 (presenting the American view of jurisprudence, in which guidelines are set in law which
reinforces judicial discretion).
15
See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 103 (1993).
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Though it is distinguished from mercy in the strong sense, this does not
diminish from the importance of mercy in the weak sense. The terminology
merely reflects a lesser degree of tension between it and the concept of justice.
Lesser Mercy is an obligation of the court which does not necessarily entail a
deviation from the principles of retribution or justice, on the contrary, it aids in
their proper application.
In light of this weakened tension, many writers have claimed that this type
of mercy is effectively superfluous, since the obligation to weigh the personal
circumstances of the defendant exists in any case, therefore, this suggested
meaning of mercy would in fact be an inherent part of the obligation to realize
justice in its full sense.16 As opposed to these commentators, who have difficulty
seeing any innovation in the requirement to apply mercy in the weak sense, this
Article argues that this sense of mercy characterizes an autonomous moral
imperative which is separate from the obligation to consider personal
circumstances. There are powerful reasons to conceptualize Lesser Mercy as
distinct from individuation. Lesser Mercy directs the court to a deliberative
process which integrates rational consideration with the heart and soul—a
necessary mindset for the proper utilization of the court’s discretion. Lesser
Mercy emphasizes the mental basis and conscious effort needed for the act of
judging, and it views the act of judging as a human interaction. Stressing the
independent meaning of Lesser Mercy will yield unique insights into the judicial
process derived from the meaning of mercy, as will be demonstrated below.
C. Mercy in the Strong Sense (“Greater Mercy”)
What is Greater Mercy, or true mercy? Greater Mercy is a residual discretion
of the court which allows for a departure from the accepted margin of
proportionality in the direction of leniency in rare and exceptional
circumstances.17

16
17

See discussion infra Section III(B)
This definition is similar to that of Fox:
The true privilege of mercy is to be found in the residual discretion vested in each sentence which
allows a downward departure from the principle of proportionality outside the principles of
mitigation. It can be utilized in exceptional circumstances to allow weight to be given to factors
which are ordinarily not regarded as relevant mitigating considerations. It allows sentencers to
give effect to significant, but as yet unaccepted, circumstances which, in their opinion, warrant
leniency.

Richard G. Fox, When Justice Sheds a Tear: The Place of Mercy in Sentencing, 25 MONASH U. L. REV. 1, 13
(1996).
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This prerogative is based on the assumption that there is a complementary
but independent function to mercy in the framework of adjudication. There are
circumstances which may be taken into account when trying the defendant that
are nonetheless not practically—nor appropriately—accommodated in the
framework of proportionality. From a substantive, expressive viewpoint,
consideration of these circumstances does not intrinsically deny the need for
proportionality and retribution, but rather, stems from recognition of the unique,
unusual nature of a situation in which the standard punitive result produces a
prima facie inequitable result. This prerogative is designed to provide the judge
with an independent, legitimate tool for the discretionary moderation of the
retribution awaiting the offender. The judge has the authority not to apply the
law to its fullest extent at times, to choose in a given case not to make exhaustive
use of the full institutional power at their disposal, in light of considerations
which justify accounting for the emotion of compassion aroused within their
heart. The uniqueness of this type of mercy emerges, as noted above, from
recognition of the residual discretion to lighten the punishment outside of the
accepted margin of proportionality. Nevertheless, the use of this authority is not
meant to be random and idiosyncratic, rather, the judge must rely on concrete
and relevant considerations for mitigating punishment.
Distinct as they may be, it is worth noting the connection between the two
types of mercy: Greater Mercy is derived of Lesser Mercy. The implementation
of Greater Mercy to deviate from the accepted margin of proportionality cannot
be achieved without accessing a state of mind which recognizes the place of the
defendant’s viewpoint in the process of sentencing, or without the arousal of
compassion which comes from the abovementioned stance.
The plea for Greater Mercy inspires some contention among the authors,
who see a tension between mercy, on the one hand, and the principles of
proportionality and the obligation to impartial justice on the other. But while
there is tension between these positions, there is also a productive dialogue
between them as well. Each has both substantive and expressive significance.
This Article’s criticism of the call for Greater Mercy relates to two issues:
First, Greater Mercy reduces considerations of mercy into the conceptual realm
of justice and equity, thus rendering mercy a redundancy;18 Second, due to that
same reduction, it delineates a boundary beyond which any further consideration
for leniency for the defendant is understood as a weakness and as
misappropriation of judicial authority. This results in anything which might be
18

This is the conceptual argument, which will be expanded in Section III.B, infra.
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associated with mercy being disguised as a consideration of justice—even
though its application remains, in practice, non-binding, and for the most part
given over to the court’s discretion—avoiding any explicit reference to the value
of mercy.
The first result of this conflation is that the judicial message is obscured.
While the reduction of the typical considerations of mercy into the framework
of justice allows one to present the ideal as consistent with objective adjudication
and equality, the human element, which is affected by compassion and mercy,
inevitably dominates the task of passing judgment, but is not recognized as a
legitimate and explicit cause of action.
The second result of this line of reasoning concerns the second half of the
argument, which negates any additional consideration for leniency that deviates
from the principle of proportionality. This part of the argument may discourage
the dynamism and development that considerations of mercy allow, limiting the
defendant to the delineated and narrow framework of concerns absorbed over
the course of time into the law. This view misses the historic dynamic process
by which what was once an ad hoc application of mercy may become a precedent
for the future, allowing the development of general principles of moderate
sentencing in the framework of law. This dynamic begins with a feeling of
discomfort at the sentence required by law, which then leads to deviating from
the letter of the law as an act of grace, finally, at its conclusion, as similar cases
pile up, a new norm is formed, constituting an inseparable part of formal justice.
The conceptual separation in law between justice and mercy is needed in order
to protect this dynamic and its flexibility.
D. True Mercy in Sentencing Based on the Assumption of Specific Legal
Liability (the Existence of Incriminating Findings, their Type and their
Degree)
The basic assumption of Greater Mercy is a finding of guilt after an
impeccable judicial proceeding, leading to a verdict appropriate in its type and
degree. Only in this context does Greater Mercy belong. As Nathan Brett writes:
If mercy plays any role in the determination of sentences, it is not in
either of the steps which lead to the judgment of culpability. For mercy
is (logically) parasitic upon a judgment of culpability. In showing that
a crime was less serious than others much like it, and in arguing that a
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defendant had a defense that law recognizes, one could not be arguing
for mercy. These are strictly related to the question of culpability.19

There should be a distinction among the three stages in determining a sentence
for a criminal act.20 The first stage is diagnosing the relative severity of the
offence. The second stage is to investigate the existence of mitigating factors. In
these two stages, even if the court finds a reason to be lenient, it is not a case of
Greater Mercy. Mercy is expressed in these stages only as Lesser Mercy, i.e., as
a particular state of mind. It is forbidden for the court to ignore defenses
(complete or partial) which are recognized in law and relevant to determining
the degree of guilt, including the degree of mens rea, the level of involvement,
the motivations and the circumstances of the defendant. The defendant has the
full right to demand proportionality and equality. Leniency based on these
considerations is mandatory and is part of retribution.21
It is only in the third stage, that of sentencing, that Greater Mercy may also
be expressed, when the court takes into account circumstances that have not yet
been recognized as relevant in the accepted margin of proportionality or weighs
them in a manner deviating from their weight in the accepted margin of
proportionality.22
It is worth reiterating that consideration of factors that diminish the degree
of guilt is not equated with mercy, since these factors have already been
assimilated into the legal framework. Further, in regard to a significant
proportion of the defenses recognized by law, one may point to the historic
evolutionary process. Even before concepts such as self-defense, infancy,
insanity were codified, these situations were considerations for leniency or
pardoning by the institutions (such as the king) vested with the power to
pardon.23 This grants an additional perspective on the function of mercy in
19

Nathan Brett, Mercy and Criminal Justice: A Plea for Mercy, 5(1) CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 81, 91 (1992).
Id. at 90–92.
21
See generally Mordechai Kremnitzer & Tatjana Hörnle, Human Dignity and the Principle of
Culpability, 44 ISR. L. REV. 115 (2011).
22
This Article argues that the courts make such an analysis in a certain manner. See, e.g., CrimA 32/14
Amash v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (Sept. 17, 2015) (Isr.). There, Justice Sohlberg ruled that the craft
of sentencing is not an exact science. Id. It is a difficult, personal, and delicate craft, which varies from one
matter to another. The court must balance different and conflicting considerations, and give each of them its
proper weight in the circumstances of the case in question—the public interest versus the interest of the
individual, the principles of adequacy, retribution, and rehabilitation, and justice given the degree of mercy.
23
Fox, supra note 17, at 8, and 47–49 (describing a similar process in terms of expanding the objective
defenses for mercy killing and the killing of domestic abusers). Indeed, the origin of the concept of affirmative
defense in Common Law is in a process whereby, after the defendant had been found guilty without the
possibility of presenting witnesses and evidence, he could appeal to the king for some degree of clemency. For
harsh penalties (capital or corporal punishment), clemency was liberally granted. With the passage of time,
20
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justice (whether in the framework of adjudication or in the framework of the
discretion of the prosecutor or of another authorized body): mercy is the residual
authority to moderate the severity of the letter of the law, and it enables a process
learning, evolution, and reform. Thus, some of the circumstances that, to date,
can only be recognized as grounds for mercy, one day may be incorporated into
the law. In this dynamic process, moderating the severity of the law on the basis
of considerations outside the accepted margin of proportionality ultimately leads
to moderation of the accepted margin of proportionality itself.
Mandatory considerations recognized by criminal defenses as ground for
acquittal or diminished culpability, or that are recognized considerations within
the framework of the accepted margin of proportionality, do not preclude an
additional layer of leniency on the grounds mercy, in light of individualistic
circumstances. Time and again, the legal terms prove insufficient, reflecting
only general doctrinal (and sometimes utilitarian) concerns which do not give
adequate response to the cognitive dissonance that arises from the sentence, or
the individualistic need to rein in punishment on account of difficult and unusual
circumstances.24
legislation sought to limit this phenomenon, leading to the codification of arguments for the defense. This is how
the concept of criminal culpability evolved into modern jurisprudence. For a fascinating survey, see THEODORE
F.T. PLUNCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 438, 442–51 (5th ed. 1929).
24
Take, for example, a case in which a person stabs his good friend to death with no explanation and no
motive, and a psychiatric evaluation determines that the assailant had no firm grasp on reality, had paranoid
thoughts and was in a psychotic state due to the use of narcotics (while still understanding his actions and the
difference between right and wrong). Based on his degree of mens rea, he is convicted of manslaughter, and not
murder. In accordance with this argument, the author does not believe that merely seeking the lesser charge has
exhausted all potential considerations for leniency in the process, given a case wherein it is deemed appropriate
to seek mercy and possible reevaluation of the defendant.
An example of similarly appropriate circumstances can be found in the infamous, R. v. Latimer, [2001]
S.C.R. 1, 3 (Can.). In this case, a father was found guilty of killing his severely disabled daughter in what he
termed a mercy killing. Id. Initially convicted of murder in the second degree, the case was thrown out over jury
tampering in the appeal, and subject to a retrial. Id. In the second trial, the lower court granted a sentence far
below the minimum required for the charge, arguing that the special circumstances of the case warranted it. The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeals overturned this verdict, increasing the sentence to the minimum ten years. Id.
at 11. The Supreme Court upheld this ruling on appeal, arguing that considerations of the circumstances of the
case had already been accounted for in the framework of the rights afforded the accused. The Supreme Court
held that considerations of mercy were an inherent component of the rights that had already been exercised on
behalf of the defendant, such as the reduction of the charge, the right to protection from cruel and unusual
punishment, and the jury nullification that had been implemented in the initial appeal. Id. at 14. The Supreme
Court also specifically mentioned the presidential right of clemency as a measure of last resort for exceptional
cases. Id. Thus, it ruled out mercy as a valid consideration in further reducing the sentence.
Another relevant example can be seen in SCrimC (DC TA) 1028/06 State of Israel v. Dolensky, Nevo
Legal Database, PM 5768(4) 2396(2007), wherein a sentence of 18 years’ incarceration in practice was handed
down. The district court held that, “The defendant’s mental state was already accounted for as grounds for
converting the charge from murder to manslaughter, not as a matter of grace, as the accuser claimed, but as a
right of the defendant under the principles of Penal Law. Thus, there is no place to account for the mental state
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Thus, the application of mercy does not negate the finding of guilt and the
degree of culpability. In The Merchant of Venice,25 William Shakespeare creates
a situation which illustrates this dilemma well.26 According to the plot of the
play, Shylock acts fully in accordance with his legal rights. In Shylock’s hand is
a contract which allows him to collect a pound of flesh from the body of the
borrower, Antonio, the sanction for not paying off the loan, and justice stands
on his side. On the other hand, the execution of the law in a literal way will bring
a severe injury to Antonio, who beseeches Shylock to show mercy and to waive
his claim.
The stated dilemma between mercy and justice only arises once we
recognize the validity and binding nature of the sanction by law. Therefore,
alongside Portia’s famous speech, in which she explicates “the quality of
mercy,”27 she utterly rejects all of the appeals to ignore the validity of the debt,
since this debt is legally binding.28
In modern legal systems, one would assume that considerations of justice
would cause the invalidation of the contract, since such a term runs contrary to
the Public Policy.29 However, the example brought in the play nonetheless
succinctly elucidates how the application of mercy assumes the recognition of a
powerful and just claim according to positive law, or in our case, the existence
of guilt, which renders the defendant deserving of punishment.
E. Mercy Toward the Convicted Party Is Not a Vested Right
It is common to describe mercy as an act of grace. Greater Mercy is not
characterized by a set of rights and duties. Rather, this Article argues that a
fundamental characteristic and definition of Greater Mercy is that an offender

of the defendant beyond this.” Id. at 2409 (author’s translation).
25
See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE.
26
This play is a resource for any who write about the conflict between justice and mercy. See Fox, supra
note 17, at 7; Muller, supra note 13, at 307–10; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE—A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 93 (1988); Trisha Olson, Pausing Upon Portia, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 299 (2003);
Frank Kermode, Justice and Mercy in Shakespeare, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1155 (1996); Stephen P. Garvey, “As the
Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1995).
27
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 25, act 4, sc. 1.
28
Id.
29
Some examples of similar statutes from around the world include “Good Morals” in German, Dutch
and Italian law. Compare BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §§ 138, 826 (Ger.), and Art. 3:40
paras. 1–3 BW (Neth.), and 1343 C.c. (It.), with Contracts Law, 5733–1973, § 31, (Isr.); see also D.D. Prentice,
Illegality and Public Policy, in CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 937–1056 (H.G. Beale ed., 2004); POSNER, supra note
26, at 93–94. By the end of the 16th century, such contractual penalties would have been anachronistic, making
Shylock’s claim a plot device. Id.
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has no right to mercy and cannot demand it. At most, one may request or petition
for mercy. There is never an obligation to act mercifully towards a specific
person.30
This characteristic of Greater Mercy is that which gives rise to the argument
that Greater Mercy is arbitrary31 because law prefers to deal with a defined set
of rights and duties. Since the defendant cannot claim mercy as a vested right,
he cannot demand equality of results as compared to another defendant who
enjoyed an act of grace. Nonetheless, while there may be no duty to act
mercifully, this does not mean that the judge is free to ignore entirely the value
of Greater Mercy as a moral principle.
This Article will address the critique of arbitrariness below.
F. Mercy Emerges from a Perspective Recognizing the Principle of
Retribution
Murphy explains that to consider the possibility of issuing a reduced
sentence from the “just-deserts” standard, we must first accept the validity of the
principle of retribution.32 Before we can deviate from the concept of retribution
in the framework of Greater Mercy, we must recognize the existence and the
power of the principle of retribution as a guiding consideration in punishment.
This clarification of Murphy is significant. The concept of mercy presupposes
the idea of moral responsibility. It is not designed to undermine the principles
which direct the sentence, nor to empty them of content. The argument for the
legitimacy of Greater Mercy calls for the integration of considerations outside
the principle of retribution as additional, balancing, moderating concerns, but it
does not come to deny the power of the principle of retribution in itself.33 On the
30

See Murphy, supra note 5, at 166.
See discussion infra Section III.C.
32
See Murphy, supra note 5, at 166.
33
By contrast, in a utilitarian theory of punishment focused on deterrence, it seems hard to argue for
mercy. For an analysis, see Muller, supra note 13, at 291–96. To explore the utilitarian-economic analysis of
this punishment, see ROBERT COTTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 445–78 (4th ed. 2004). In this
theory of punishment, accepting the defendant’s request for mercy has value only in terms of indirect
consequential benefits. It is not made out of mercy or compassion. Indeed, we shall proceed to examine some
beneficial consequences born of mercy. However, it is the author’s view that mercy and compassion are not
quantifiable, such that calling for the integration of mercy in law cannot be based on a given consequential
consideration. In this context, one should note the difference between mercy and leniency out of concern to the
defendant’s rehabilitation. The considerations of rehabilitation are based (perhaps solely) on the real public
interest of preventing recidivism. Mercy, on the other hand, focuses on moderating the injury to the defendant,
without any compelling public interest (less the perceived interest of adhering to the norm of mercy in and of
itself).
31
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contrary, a legal system which attributes importance to the principle of
retribution may recognize the important function which Greater Mercy fills as
well. The retributive theory of punishment is distinguished from the utilitarian
theory of punishment in that it places at its center the principle of human
dignity.34 The punishment is a response to a crime. It does not consider the
individual a tool to advance society’s goals of deterrence.35 The theory of
retribution is based on moral balance. At its foundation stands the central idea
of protecting the unique status of a person as a free autonomous actor who can
make rational choices.36 The justification of punishment emerges from the
requirement for moral balance and reciprocity.37 The offender is seen as
someone who inequitably shrugs the yoke of obedience to the law, violating the
moral balance among individuals in society. However, the sentencer must take
into account not only the victim’s dignity and autonomy, which require
retribution, but also the dignity and autonomy of the offender, this balance being
expressed through the avoidance of cruel, extreme or humiliating sentences.38
Even when judicial authorities act in the victim’s interest, they seek to protect
the human value and dignity of the offender.
Muller explains that retribution does not promote a one-sided argument for
revenge, but rather, an argument for even-handed justice.39 In his view:
At the very core of the Kantian notions of human dignity and
autonomy is the principle of respect: no individual may be the subject
of condescending, mocking, insulting, patronizing, or demeaning
consideration by another or by society. . . .
Retributivism therefore demands a sentencing method that obliges
sentencers to treat criminals as the unique individuals that they are.
This demand necessarily goes unmet in a rigid sentencing regime that
drives out discretion in favor of a blind and faceless uniformity. A true
retributivist, committed fundamentally to respecting the autonomy of
all human beings, cannot say to a defendant in good faith, “I will take
you seriously as a human being, but I will only do so by reference to
the category you occupy on a predetermined schedule.”40

This argument emphasizes the importance of the individualization of
punishment and avoiding a rigid categorization. Since these considerations are
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Muller, supra note 13, at 296.
Id. at 304–05 (citation omitted).
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optional and dependent on the judicial perspective—grounded on a wide
expanse of possibilities in the verdict—realizing a proper and just sentence is
contingent on adopting the appropriate state of mind, that invoked by the
application of Lesser Mercy. This state of mind is designed to balance the scales
and prevent overestimation of the pure considerations of retribution. It ignores
both the weight of the possible injury of the sentence upon the defendant and the
defendant’s relatives, and the subjective factors which relate to the execution of
the crime which must be weighed when determining punishment.41 Internalizing
the moderating effect of Lesser Mercy prevents the court’s erroneous reliance
upon a simplistic understanding of the concept of retribution. Its significance
lies, among other purposes, in restraining the impact of retribution upon the
autonomous status and dignity of the convicted criminal.
Nevertheless, for Greater Mercy as an act which deviates from the principle
of proportionality, there would appear to be no place in the view of pure
retributive justice. To justify employing it, an additional argument is required—
namely, that despite the importance of retribution, one must recognize that it is
not the be-all and end-all, but only one of a broader range of concerns in
determining criminal punishment. Recognizing the existence of the judicial
consideration of Greater Mercy, which allows for the reduction of the
punishment even below the margin of proportionality, is based on the
understanding that judges should be guided by the principle of retribution. At
the same time, they must recognize values and considerations outside the
principle of retribution,42 and the limitations and deficiencies of the stated
principle. Recognizing the possibility of being merciful in cases where a sense
of compassion is aroused means realizing that neither harsh justice nor strict
utilitarianism possess the means to express all the basic values of our society.43
Greater Mercy qualifies the formalistic concept of justice. This also reminds us
that the overarching purpose of the law is not only retribution, but the
harmonious synchronization of superior values, such as conserving and
nurturing normative and positive community ties and fostering a reality of
mutual respect, hope, and readiness to sacrifice.44
41

Id. at 335.
Brett, supra note 19, at 92.
43
See generally Olson, supra note 26, at 309. Compare this to the approach of Posner, who sees mercy
as expressing a transition from formalistic, draconian and primitive justiciability to more flexible and fair
parameters based on the principles of equity. Posner does not argue on behalf of Greater Mercy. POSNER, supra
note 26.
44
See generally Olson, supra note 26, at 323. Olson writes the following about Portia’s words: “Her
speech on mercy . . . catches us by the throat, enkindles us in reminding us that law is, at its loftiest and highest,
a living bond that requires humility, sacrifice, and risk commingled in the quality we call mercy and likely
subjecting us to a bittersweet kind of suffering.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
42
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Greater Mercy, when it comes to qualifying the principle of retribution and
proportionality, indicates that the legal system itself, in expressing justice, is not
separated from society and its other elements. The system has the power to
express humane considerations as well: compassion, grace, and forbearance.
These in turn restrain vices—e.g., rage and revenge. Recognition of the
legitimacy of Greater Mercy emerges from the existence of a possible gap
between the proper results in a theoretical sense, in a world in which only the
letter of the law exists and its concrete meanings, alongside the attribution of
value to humanity and compassion in the heart of the judge. Even a judge, like
any human, may be endowed with humane vision, and may feel distress when
justice seems to demand an exaggerated or absurd result.45
G. Mercy Serves as a Balancing and Tempering Factor in the Judicial Context
Murphy denies the existence of a morally autonomous value of mercy:
[Mercy] is a virtue that tempers or “seasons” justice – something one
adds to justice (the primary virtue) to dilute it and perhaps, if one takes
the metallurgical metaphor of tempering seriously, to make it
stronger.46

Murphy does not recognize the value of mercy, and he discusses it in a manner
that trends between skeptical and cynical. Nevertheless, he inadvertently
expresses the role of mercy in this context well. Depending on the perspective,
mercy can be seen to dilute justice, but at the same time, to temper it.
H. Mercy Is Neither Equivalent to Forgiveness nor Dependent upon
Forgiveness
There is a difference between mercy and absolution. Forgiveness is a change
in attitude towards the offender. It is an expression of overcoming injury and
preparedness to be freed from feelings of anger or hatred towards the offender.47
It may be part of the process of restorative justice, as a step prior to taking
merciful actions, but forgiveness is not a necessary condition without which

45
See generally LINDA ROSS-MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY 86 (2010). In her book, Ross-Meyer
suggests a process of compromise designed to unite the defendant and the victim in internalizing the severity of
the act and encouraging a process of remorse and caring. Id. Here, mercy mediates the victim-centered societal
perspective of punishment and the defendant-centered perspective. Id. This approach advocates reconciliation at
the expense of retribution.
46
Murphy, supra note 5, at 166.
47
Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 111, 157–58 (1988).
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mercy is untenable.48 Forgiveness expresses a decision to overcome feelings of
anger and consider the offender as a moral person who is not necessarily bad.
On the other hand, mercy is applied while still holding on to the view that the
offender carries responsibility and deserves retribution.49 Compassion is not
forgiveness for the crime but waives the severest punishment to the extent the
law allows.
Forgiveness is first and foremost the issue of the victim, it expresses the
victim’s emotional relationship towards the offender and their willingness to
forgive. It is thus questionable whether another can forgive in the victim’s name.
However, a person who carries an institutional role with the authority to apply
sanctions and to exercise authority and control, has the status to take actions
which express mercy.50 Incorporating the victim into the process of sentencing,
as well as advancing the process of asking for forgiveness, forgiving and
reconciliation may allow for a more complete mending process, which will
influence the considerations of punishment. In this process, mercy towards the
offender is also based on the value of repentance and the change in the victim’s
emotional state. However, one must distinguish between mercy and forgiveness.
I. The Argument for Mercy Is Not a Call to Adopt a Blanket Policy of Lenient
Sentencing
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter by clarifying the relationship
between considerations of mercy and questions of severity or leniency in the
policy of sentencing.
The argument for mercy should not be seen as a suggestion for general
leniency in sentencing. Indeed, applying mercy may lead to leniency in
punishment, but there is a difference between the result of specific circumstances
and sweeping general leniency in punishment. Determining the appropriate level
of punishment in the criminal setting should be a political decision for the
democratically chosen representatives of society. This decision is influenced by
different factors, and it is legitimate as long as the punishment is proportional
and not cruel. Greater Mercy is reserved for unique and special circumstances,
and it is not applied as a sweeping policy. It is not designed to preclude severe
sentences when such are warranted.51 It is our belief that even one who advocates
48

Fox, supra note 17, at 6.
Hampton, supra note 47, at 158.
50
See Murphy, supra note 5, at 167.
51
One may claim that, particularly when the sentence is moderated from the start, the judge will not need
to resort to mercy. Conversely, if strict punishment is the default setting, there may be stronger conflicts and
49
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for more severe punishment generally may recognize the importance of the
prerogative to moderate the punishment in cases which arouse compassion in
the heart of the judge. Recognizing the legitimacy of mercy (in both senses
presented in this Article) does not mean that leniency towards the offender is the
default setting. Our argument for mercy is for the legitimacy of a given kind of
consideration, a kind of perspective and possible actions pursuant thereto, not
an argument for a sweeping policy with deliberately lenient consequences.
II. THE EXISTING DEBATE ABOUT THE PLACE OF MERCY IN COURT
A. Principles of the Legal Debate about Sentencing
To further contextualize the discussion of the role of mercy in justice, this
Article first recalls a number of prominent features of the development of the
legal discourse, albeit in a limited capacity.
This Article intends to use the example provided by Israeli law, both for
reasons of convenience and owing to its rough approximation of the state of
affairs of other legal systems (such as that of the United States) in this regard.
Under Israeli law, the order of priorities in sentencing has not been definitely
determined by legislation. Indeed, there is not even a unified theoretical basis of
the purpose behind sentencing: Deterrent, utilitarian, preventative, and
rehabilitative aims are all important but often confused, frequently, no one
consideration comes to the forefront.52 The essential characteristic of the

paradigmatic cases for utilizing mercy in specific circumstances. This is all based on the assumption that there
is some ideal sentence, such that when the gap between it and the prescribed sentence appears grows, the
potential for mercy also grows.
52
See, e.g., CrimA 8897/99 John Smith v. State of Israel, HCP 58(3) 487, 500 (2003) (Isr.); CrimA
4890/01 State of Israel v. John Smith, HCP 56(1) 594, 601 (2001) (Isr.); CrimA 3004/98 State of Israel v.
Shabtai, HCP 55(3) 577, 581–82, 585 (1998) (Isr.).
A similar divergence can be seen in US case-law. See generally Thomas Orsagh, The Judicial Response
to Crime and the Criminal: A Utilitarian Perspective, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 369, 382 (1985). The
conclusions of this meta-study failed to produce a clear focus in terms of the salience of one of the aforesaid
considered purposes, the utilitarian purpose, in sentencing. Similar conclusions are reached by, Richard S. Frase,
Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 83 (2005); Christine Chamberlin, Not Kids Anymore: A Need for
Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice, 42 B.C. L. REV 391 (2001); Gordon A. Martin Jr., The
Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There A Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV 57 (1992).
A clear retributive focus can be seen from the deliberations in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
which seems to expressly reject the consideration of a more utilitarian mindset in applying the death penalty.
See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). While
representing a general restriction of the death penalty, these cases also seem to link this finding to a strictly
retributive interpretation, whereby capital punishment can only be justified as the just-deserts of a crime resulting
in death. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has also seemed to contradict this focus by upholding the
need for individuation of sentencing in capital cases—as demonstrated in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
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discussion of punishment is the wide discretion which is usually given to the
court for determining the verdict. For most crimes, the legislature determines a
maximum sentence which the court cannot violate, but it does not set mandatory
minimums.53 The work of making the punishment fit the crime (or the criminal)
requires a clear field of judicial discretion, which cannot be activated in a
vacuum, nor arbitrarily. The judge’s labor is a concrete application of the law
and its spirit in fitting the punishment to the unique circumstances of the crime
and the criminal, balancing relevant considerations for leniency and stringency.
The judge is led by precedent—i.e. by concrete rationales and policies which
have been found in prior rulings—and, similarly, by a range of considerations
evaluated in light of the evidence and the specific circumstances of the case. The
principle of individuation of punishment, which allows the court flexibility in
weighing the concrete circumstances unique to the case, is essential in Israeli
law.54
In recent years, some debate has arisen over the proposal of “originating
sentences” (akin to mandatory minimums, though not specifically set as the
lower limit, so much as a general reference point) to guide the judge, along with
predefined considerations for stringency or leniency.55 However, no legislation
in connection with this dialogue has passed into law to date.
At present, there still is a wide range of discretion at the judge’s disposal in
respect to sentencing. However, this reality also sharpens the difficulty of
distinguishing between exigent and essential considerations of sentencing in the
280, 303 (1976), marking a departure from retributive justice. These approaches have foundations in the history
of U.S. courts. “It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to
consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81, 113 (1996); see also Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (“For the
determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the
crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the
character and propensities of the offender.”).
53
Though, as noted, this approach has seen recent challenges in the efforts of some legislatures to
reestablish faith in the consistency and legitimacy of sentencing. See generally Ohana, supra, note 2 (referencing
the Israeli Goldberg Committee and the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines). It is also worth noting that
mandatory minimums often do exist for the most severe crimes, as in Section 300 of the Israeli Penal Code,
Penal Law, 5737–1977. Even in cases where Israeli law does provide for such sentencing minimums, it will
usually grant the court an opening for discretion under extenuating circumstances, to be recorded. This is
compared to more liberal use of such sentencing elsewhere, see U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C.
801, and its consequences on the U.S. justice system in general.
54
See, the important ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court in Leave of Criminal Appeal 3173/09 Pragin v.
State of Israel 1, 3 (unpublished, May 5, 2005) (Isr.) (explaining that the court negated the policy of “tariff
punishments” for crimes involving illegal entry into the country while reinterring the indispensability of the
principle of individuation of punishment).
55
See, e.g., Ohana, supra note 2, at 625.
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framework of the conception and application of “justice,” and the considerations
of sentencing which relate to concepts such as mercy or pity.
Another factor to be considered is the fact that, in recent years, the Israeli
public has called, sometimes quite loudly, for harsher sentencing.56 This has not
gone unnoticed by legislators and judges, resulting in a noticeable trend towards
severity in sentencing. This tendency finds expression in:
1) The assignment of greater weight to narrow retributive considerations
as a point of departure for sentencing, such as by requiring an
appropriate relationship between the severity of the crime (from an
essentially categorical-conceptual viewpoint) and the measure of
sentencing deviation due to unique circumstances for leniency;57
2)

The significant bolstering of the discussion of victims’ rights, as
expressed in the procedural integration of crime victims in presenting
evidence for the issue of sentencing, and emphasis on the rationale of
protecting victims and their rights in sentencing;58 and

3)

The attribution of greater importance to practical considerations of
deterrence.59

Even in the Knesset, a number of draft bills have been proposed aiming to
increase the severity of sentences.60 The calls for stringency, and the tendency
56
See Amnon Maranda, Mazuz: Punishment in Israel is Too Lenient in Many Cases (Dec. 21, 2009),
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3822927,00.html.
57
It may be that the “principle of retribution” and “proportionality” in legal discourse is not based on
Kantian rationales, but rather the general tendency toward harsher sentencing.
58
See, e.g., Crime Victims’ Rights Law, 5761-2001, SH 2830 (Isr.). For a review of the case-law
perspectives on the law’s effect on the standing of crime victims in the criminal trial, including the impact thereof
on the matter of sentencing, see HCJ 5699/07, Jane Doe v. Attorney General, HCP 2008(1) 2954 (2008) (Isr.);
HCJ 5961/07, Jane Doe v. State Prosecutor, HCP 2007(3) 4611 (2007) (Isr.).
Around the same time, we can observe a parallel process developing with the legislation of the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act as a part of the Justice for All Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. This demonstrates a similar
focus on exacting a fitting restitution for the victims of crimes.
These processes can themselves be seen as a natural evolution of the national internalization process
resulting from the ongoing development of these concepts in international law. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 40/34, 1985
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (Nov. 29, 1985).
59
See, e.g., 3173/09 Pragin v. State of Israel (2009) (Isr.) (emphasizing deterrence while rejecting
individual circumstances has become more prominent in recent years, but not without some resistance). For a
reference of this same movement expressed in American law, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 444
(2008).
60
Beyond the general movement, there have been specific attempts to determine mandatory minimums
for a wide range of crimes, including sex crimes, abuse of minors and seniors and a long list of other offenses in
Israeli law. See, e.g., Israeli Penal Code Bill (Amendment- Stricter Punishment for Attacking a Medical Staff),
2018 (P/5164/20), Israeli Penal Code Bill (Amendment- Stricter Punishment for Assaulting a Minor or Helpless
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to equate a fitting verdict to a “tough” verdict, form the wider context of our
present effort to analyze the attribute of mercy, which possesses the promising
potential to moderate and balance these inclinations.
Notwithstanding the consideration of these various factors, customary legal
discussion of sentencing is characterized by rhetoric which attempts to bridge
the desire to grant verdicts an objective image—expressing the idea of the rule
of law and the principles of justice and equality—and the exigency of responding
to specific considerations. Among these are human considerations external to
the characterization of the crime and the degree of involvement and guilt in its
commission. These considerations include the sentence’s effect on the criminal,
their age, regret, sincerity, difficult life circumstances, unique motives, and the
emotional impact of the verdict.
B. The Main Approaches in the Legal Discourse on Mercy in Judicial
Proceedings
In the literature, there are three essential approaches to mercy in sentencing.
The first is the rejectionist approach, which argues that in sentencing, every
morally relevant consideration is encompassed in the concept of justice.
Therefore, any further act of leniency defies the law and represents a case of
unjust and unequal treatment.61
The second common view is the reductive view, which tries to resolve the
conceptual tension by creating a formulation of justice which will include mercy,
thus granting more limited significance to the concept of mercy.62 This approach
dilutes the impact of mercy, sometimes reducing it to taking account of the
particular circumstances of the offender, while distinguishing between this
consideration and the exigent objective consideration of the circumstances of the
crime and the level of guilt.63 There are those who argue that mercy is analogous
to equity,64 i.e., the “rectification of law where it fails through generality.”65 This
Person), 2018 (P/5830/20), The Counter-Terrorism Bill (Amendment- Stricter Punishment), 2018 (P/5541/20),
and Israeli Penal Code Bill (Amendment- Stricter Punishment for Assaulting Social Workers), 2018
(P/5540/20).
61
See, e.g., Yaniv Waki & Yoram Rabin, Constructing Judicial Discretion in Punishment: A Snapshot
and Reflections on the Future to Come, 2 HAPRAKLIT 413 (2013).
62
Nussbaum, supra note 15; POSNER, supra note 26, at 93; H. Scott Hestevold, Disjunctive Desert, 20
AM. PHIL. Q. 357 (1983); H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHILOSOPHY 353 (1971); James Sterba, Can A Person
Deserve Mercy? 10 J. SOC. PHIL. 11 (1979); Steven Sverdlik, Justice and Mercy, 15 J. SOC. PHIL. 36 (1985).
63
Brett, supra note 19, at 83.
64
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 98–99 (arguing the source of the concept of equity, a tool for the
accepted development of jurisprudence, is found in Aristotle’s approach to justice).
65
Jack B. Weinstein, Justice and Mercy—Law and Equity, 28 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 818 (1984)
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view leads to the distinction between legitimate mercy (within the framework of
the legal system) and illegitimate mercy (vigilantism). There are also those who
support the definition of mercy in the legal argument not as an act, but as a frame
of mind or bearing which the judge must adopt in the context of deliberations,
similar to our definition of Lesser Mercy.66
Some claim that the distinction between the former and latter approaches—
the former negating the application of mercy in the legal process—is only
semantic.67 This author disputes that notion. Proclaiming the significance of
mercy in judicial deliberation as a basic element is important in its own right. It
opens the door to legitimizing leniency based on an appreciation for the
defendant’s viewpoint, even by showing compassion beyond the categorical,
objective considerations relevant to the determination of the degree of guilt.
These approaches can provide, at best, a weakened case for mercy, rather
than a comprehensive argument.68 The concept of mercy remains limited in the
framework of this definition. Indeed, this author believes that no conception of
mercy that is limited to the role of mere equity could be considered complete.69
The third approach is the positive view, which claims that mercy functions
differently from justice or equity. This approach (“true mercy”)70 rests on the
residual right of deliberation, which allows the court to deviate from the
principle of retribution, consistent with this Article’s concept of Greater Mercy.
Mercy as a prerogative does not express a general policy, but is applied in
specific and unique circumstances, when the otherwise ostensibly appropriate
sentence arouses discomfort. People recognize the possibility of imposing on the
offender a sentence more lenient than that apparently mandated by the letter of
the law or the margin of proportionality.

(citation omitted).
66
Muller, supra note 13, at 320, 329.
67
See generally Brett, supra note 19.
68
Olson writes the following of Shakespeare:
Equity is simply a more refined application of the law to a given situation which fills in the gaps
and cracks left open by the virtue of law’s generality. . . .
What ‘Merchant’ proposes . . . is that a conflict will always remain impassive to just resolution
when justice is understood to be giving each his due.
Olson, supra note 26, at 314.
69
Which is not to negate the importance of these considerations in the framework of sentencing, even if
not specifically as those elements representing the contribution of mercy.
70
Fox, supra note 17, at 13–14.
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While this Article has outlined above three salient approaches to mercy in
judicial proceedings, theories in this regard are many and sundry.
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: TENSION BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF “JUSTICE” AND
THE CONCEPT OF “MERCY”
A. General Overview
The moral value of mercy is intuitively inferred. Therefore, the question that
must be addressed is not, what good does mercy serve?, but rather, the reverse:
what is wrong with incorporating mercy (as an independent factor) in
sentencing? Critics such as Murphy argue strenuously that mercy in justice is
filed with paradoxes, in light of the ultimate inability to reconcile mercy with
justice.71
This Article analyzes nine arguments for precluding mercy from the process
of sentencing (naturally, there is some overlap among them).72
B. The Conceptual Argument
There is, firstly, a certain conceptual tension between justice and mercy. The
coexistence of these two concepts creates an apparent paradox, since, if mercy
allows for deviation from justice, does it not necessarily create injustice?73 This
paradox is not merely intuitive, but only intensifies when applied to the debate
over the moral status of virtues and obligations.
The most explicit formulation of this criticism is provided by Muller, who
presents the following question: “if justice is a moral virtue, and mercy” serves
to constrain justice, then how can we consider mercy a virtue? For a virtuous
person, a moral virtue is not a matter of choice, it presents an obligation to act
in a certain way. How can one act virtuously by hedging virtue?74
In the context of justice, the judge must consider all of the relevant moral
concerns, including by distinguishing between different cases on the basis of
their circumstances. In Murphy’s view, when the judge chooses to be lenient
71

See Murphy, supra note 5.
In that manner, it should be mentioned, first and foremost—that justice is a recognized consideration
in judgment. And so ruled Justice Alon in CrimA 1399/91 Leibovitch v. State of Israel 47(1) PD 177 (1993)
(Isr.): “For the scales, we are allowed as judges, to add a certain amount of mercy [. . .] but only a certain
amount.” Id. at § 14 (authors translation).
73
Fox, supra note 17, at 2.
74
Muller, supra note 13, at 288.
72
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based on these varying circumstances, they are not being merciful, but rather,
applying a principle included in justice (or, in other words, preventing injustice).
Thus, the further consideration of mercy reflects a redundancy. Alternatively, if,
after weighing all of the relevant moral considerations, the judge chooses to be
lenient for reasons of mercy, this would be an immoral act against justice
because “[m]ercy is at best a redundancy, and at worst a vice.”75
To refute these seemingly convincing arguments we must first examine two
basic assumptions that underpin them. One assumption is that justice includes
all relevant moral considerations. This assumption is necessary to their rejection
of Greater Mercy as a legitimate consideration in the judicial process. The
second assumption is that there is no need to distinguish between different
mental processes with different contributions to sentencing. This second
assumption is what leads them to rejected Lesser Mercy as an extraneous
redundancy.
Let us examine this second assumption: Even if formal justice were to
include all of the relevant moral considerations in the given case, there would
still be reason to distinguish among the judge’s mental processes. Alongside
intellectual considerations, there is a place for being open to emotional
considerations and their influence. The reason for this is twofold. First, there is
an intrinsic value in Lesser Mercy, even when its application does not ultimately
alter the result. Second, in most cases, the intellectual considerations are not
sufficient to determine the court’s course of action in each case. After
considering these possibilities, it is clear that even the proper employment of
rules based on formal justice alone requires the adoption of the appropriate
judicial state of mind. This would mean that Lesser Mercy is not redundant at
all, on the contrary, Lesser Mercy is exigent, because it contributes something
beyond rationalistic considerations. It allows the court to examine the defendant
from a position that is capable of expressing identification, empathy, and
compassion.
Returning to the first assumption, whereby justice includes all relevant moral
considerations. This premise, as well, cannot be accepted without caveat because
the assumption is only valid as it relates to substantive, absolute justice. Only
with respect to substantive justice can one assume that it encompasses all moral
considerations.76 This is because courts do not apply substantive justice, but
75

Id. at 301.
Indeed, there is room for speculation as to whether there may yet be moral considerations which, in
principle, are immune to incorporation as a set rules, and therefore lie beyond the boundaries of substantive
justice. This author poses that it is impossible to negate the existence of moral considerations which are immune
76
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formal justice, which does not and cannot include all possible moral
considerations. At times, deviating from formal justice may even be considered
commendable.
Indeed, many of those who deny mercy in the judicial process recognize that
formal justice must accommodate particularistic circumstances, but designate
this as a complementary function which moderates the severity of law on the
basis of equity,77 which act as a certain type of charity.78 Proponents of this
approach assert that recognition of the moral requirement of equity in the judicial
process renders mercy in justice superfluous.
However, the argument seems insufficient. Equity is ostensibly based only
on rationalistic considerations, and excludes mercy being open to emotional
considerations. It is our belief that Greater Mercy should fulfill the function of
moderating formal justice, employing a deliberative process which integrates
rational and emotional considerations. This belief is based on the recognition
that there is a need for judges to have an appropriate state of mind to apply
principles and considerations which have their place in formal justice because
of their under-determinacy. This need only grows when the court deviates from
the path of considerations recognized and anchored in law. In other words, this
Article proposes that the full and appropriate realization of the function of
moderating formal justice is not possible if the court’s considerations are
confined to the narrow limits of rational, analytical considerations. Those who
sit in judgment should be open to considerations stemming from feelings of
empathy, sympathy, compassion, and so forth.

to the formulation of rules and principles, as codifying them obscures their true nature. This view has much in
common with moral particularism, see Jonathan Darcy, Moral Particularism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2017). For a deeper analysis, see JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT
PRINCIPLES, 7, 11–12 (2004); Gerald Dworkin, Unprincipled Ethics, 20 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 224, 225, 226–
27, 228, 235–36 (1995). We would like to thank Professor Enoch for pointing this connection out to us.
77
POSNER, supra note 26, at 98–99. Aristotle stresses equity serving as a moderating function in terms of
the formulation of rules and principles. According to this view, the ideal of legalistic justice may turn out to be
imperfect in terms of the ideal of absolute justice when the rule must be applied to particularistic circumstances.
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book v, 1137b1–6, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1795
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). See also Allan Beever, Aristotle on Equity, Law, and Justice, 10 LEGAL THEORY
33, 35–36 (2004). A legal view which demands the strict application of general principles cannot realize justice
at all times. In Aristotle’s view, the gap between the legalistic ideal of justice and the ideal of absolute justice is
bridged by equity, a moral requirement which fixes imperfections which spring from severe applications of the
requirements of justice. It has even been posited that “equity is justice’s rebellion against law.” See John Gardner,
The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law, 53 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 149, 168, 173–74. (2000). This
indicates that justice itself is comprised of components that exist in tension with one another.
78
See Murphy, supra note 5, at 162.
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There is normative precedent that supports the association of the moderating
function specifically within Greater Mercy, creating a kind of dualist system
wherein mercy and justice exist as independent but complementary concepts.
Thus, for example, associating the moderating function of formal justice with
mercy reduces the danger that formal justice will be confused for absolute,
substantive justice. It also allows for the dynamic process of the historical
perspective, whereby leniency “beyond the letter of the law,” over the course of
many years, becomes law, the norm which was determined before to be “beyond
the letter of the law” transforms into a principle which is compelling and binding
principle, even doctrinaire.79 Recognizing the moderating function of mercy
allows a developmental process of study and repair, wherein that which ab initio
seems to be mercy external to justice may turn out to be an inseparable part of
the rules employed within the framework of justice.
This dual system also allows the court, as a social institution, to consider the
known categories of circumstances that are difficult to consider in the
framework of formal justice, such as the defendant’s remorse. This Article will
briefly digress to demonstrate the issue of the status and validity of remorse at
the time of sentencing has interested many scholars.80 Still others oppose the
inclusion of this consideration owing to the immoral incentive to express
remorse outwardly only, as part of “the new culture of apology” which
encourages a justice system that functions as an assembly line.81 There is no
doubt that, in the framework of the existing judicial process, it is difficult to
distinguish between moral, sincere remorse and utilitarian remorse, which does
not spring from an internal, subjective feeling.82 Scholars such as Murphy claim
that the existing justice prefers style over substance in this regard, i.e. an apology

79
E.g., in Jewish law, many Ashkenazic scholars, such as Raavan and Raavya, view “beyond the letter
of the law” as something which may be enforced by the court. See Mordechai, Bava Metzia, 257, New Responsa
Maharil, 136, 140, 147 (Jerusalem 1977); Aguda, Bava Metzia, 34; see also Responsa Maharam Mintz, 101
(Jerusalem 5751). Even if the court does not have the power to enforce it, a punctilious person will act
appropriately. Some differentiate: Generally “it is good and proper to act beyond the letter of the law,” but in
appropriate cases, e.g., when a pauper finds a rich man’s lost property, and by the letter of the law there is no
obligation to return it, “there is no need to act beyond the letter of the law.” Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat,
259:5. However, some disagree. See id. at 12:2; Saadia Gaon, Sefer Ha-pikadon. Generally, Sephardic authorities
do not adopt the former view, but in some responsa there are exceptions to be found, Responsa Rosh, 107:6
(Jerusalem, 1994).
80
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87–91 (2004); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me! – Remorse, Apology, and
Criminal Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371, 374, 377–79, 382 (2006); Ralph Slovenko, Remorse, 34 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 397, 397–98, 402, 406, 419 (2006); Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 131–32 (2006).
81
Murphy’s criticism is relevant as well. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 372–74, 377–79, 382, 385.
82
Professor Chaim Gans uses Kantian terminology in Iyunei Mishpat 17, 187 (1992).
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which is only an act of “cheap grace.”83 As opposed to utilitarian remorse, moral
remorse is not a ceremonial or verbal act which is expressed in an external
display, it is supposed to reflect a mental state of internalization of the
wrongfulness of the criminal act, stemming from an authentic feeling of grief
and embarrassment and a sincere desire to repair and to seek forgiveness. The
introspective nature of this duty makes it difficult to formulate standards for a
clear examination of sincerity.84 After all is said and done, any external
demonstration is only a display, which leaves the suspicion of dissembling and
hypocrisy.85 Conversely, there is concern that, owing to excessive suspicion, one
might dismiss the honesty of the defendant’s remorse based on diagnostical
processes that are not always logical or fair.86 Justice must strive, as much as
possible, to encourage sincere and moral remorse, rather than outward displays.
Remorse such as this does its work in the framework of restorative justice.
This Article proposes that considering every expression of remorse by the
defendant (or alternatively, its absence) as a sentencing consideration in the
framework of formal justice, retribution or proportionality would be a mistake.
Automatic consideration of apologies and expressions of regret at the penalty
phase sends a message that the offender will only be punished in the absence of
regret. This pattern creates contempt for the concept of regret and undermines
the concept of remorse. In this reality, the chance that remorse will be moral,
subjective and sincere is reduced. Therefore, there is no justification to see the
defendant who expresses proper remorse as deserving of a less severe
punishment.87 Moreover, regret may become, in Orwellian terms, an incentive
for the defendant to perform an act which legitimates the conviction which they
have decried as invalid until this point.88
83
84

Murphy, supra note 80, at 372.
See Ward, supra note 80, at 167. Ward writes:
The failure of remorse is simply the failure of men to be able to read the innermost thoughts and
feelings of other men—an age-old problem which plagues many of mankind’s interpersonal
relationships. No one really knows what remorse is—and courts certainly don’t seem to know it
when they see it. Anything that is so intrinsically unknowable cannot fairly be the basis for
extended (or reduced) periods of incarceration in any system of justice.

Id. at 167.
85
Expressing remorse depends on the defendant’s articulation, influenced by intelligence, experience and
the directions received, as well as cultural values and any psychological or developmental disabilities.
86
See Ward, supra note 80, at 190–91, for a discussion of risk of discounting remorse without legitimate
concerns.
87
Gans differs offering two reasons: true remorse lessens the need for deterrence, as recidivism is
unlikely, and true remorse also indicates a redeemable character, which means that retribution demands that the
maximum sentence not be applied. Gans, supra note 82, at 189. He goes on to note that true remorse can reform
the offender totally, though even self-serving grief is relevant to determine specific deterrence. Id. at 190.
88
We should distinguish between expressing remorse, on the one hand, and reparative actions, on the
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It is in precisely this circumstance that we come to understand the utility of
mercy—a tool best suited to examining the expression of remorse. No
expression of regret can establish a right to lenient sentencing, while, on the
other hand, the choice of a defendant claiming innocence not to express should
not necessarily to be counted against them.89 However, evidence of a deeper
process of repentance in the defendant’s soul justifies the extension of grace.
The link that exists between remorse and mercy allows the adoption of a nonmechanical and non-artificial perspective towards it.
Returning to our proposal to advocate for the view of mercy as a value
independent from and complementary to justice, it is worth noting in, this
context, that the prescribed dualist system reflects basic intuitions, the
expression of which can be found in various sources. The dichotomous vision of
justice against mercy is similarly expressed by Portia in Shakespeare’s Merchant
of Venice: “And earthly power doth then show likest God’s When mercy seasons
justice.”90
C. The Argument of Arbitrariness
Another argument of those who reject utilizing Greater Mercy is that it is
subject to whim. Just as there is no obligation to utilize mercy, the defendant has
no right to demand Greater Mercy.91 This may lead one to the conclusion that
the decision to employ Greater Mercy is an arbitrary act that undermines the
concept of equality before the law.92 Formally, the demand for equal treatment
at the hands of the law in similar cases (and different treatment for dissimilar
cases) negates the possibility of the existence of optional factors for lenient
treatment.93 While consideration of the particular circumstances of each case is
a fundamental concept of justice and equity and demanded by these concepts,
any further consideration for leniency beyond that prescribed by justice
other. The latter involves returning stolen property and the like, which involves a material consideration which
is appropriate for considerations of justice and reward.
89
In Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), the Supreme Court found that a guilty plea is not a
waiver of one’s Fifth Amendment privilege at sentencing. The Arizona Court of Appeals found “[a]s contrition
or remorse necessarily imply guilt, it would be irrational or disingenuous to expect or require one who maintains
his innocence to express contrition or remorse.” State v. Hardwick, 905 P.2d 1384, 1391, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
Nevertheless, courts do in practice take a lack of remorse as a factor mitigating towards severity. See Ward supra
note 80, at 159.
90
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 25, act 4, sc. 1, l. 185–86.
91
It appears that this characterization of mercy is definitional and that there is a consensus about it. There
are those who view it as an imperfect duty in Kantian terms. See, e.g., Rainbolt, supra note 10, at 171; Murphy,
supra note 5, at 183.
92
Markel, supra note 5, at 1455–56.
93
Brett, supra note 19, at 86.
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undermines not only justice, but the principle of equality as well. If there is no
right to Greater Mercy, then the act of mercy is a matter of luck, which is
dependent on the random state of mind of the presiding judge in question.
Moreover, this argument can also be put forward in the context of capricious
use of Greater Mercy to disguise illicit motives, such as the distinction between
defendants on the basis of prejudice, discriminatory considerations, paternalism,
arrogance and even oppression.94 In practice, the application of Greater Mercy
risks creating an opening for all manner of ulterior motives to enter the judicial
equation.
The force of the argument of arbitrariness turns on this question: Does
Greater Mercy apply to circumstances that are immune to formulation as rules
and principles? If Greater Mercy deals with considerations of this nature, then
Greater Mercy may indeed seem arbitrary and unequal.
The claim of arbitrariness appears to pose a significant challenge to the thesis
of this Article, which does not preclude the possible use of Greater Mercy in
cases relating to circumstances immune, in principle, to formulation as rules,
and should consequently not be subject to incorporation into the law.95 However,
the claim of arbitrariness against our position is inconclusive, as this Article shall
presently show. There are, in fact, three reasons to oppose the inequality
argument.
First, consequential inequality does not mean arbitrariness. Greater Mercy
places equally before all convicted persons the possibility that their punishment
may be lightened, if so justified. However, no given defendant may demand a
verdict which expresses grace and mercy. The inequality of results need not
indicate arbitrariness, as long as the defendant has been given a full opportunity
to present arguments and the court has seriously considered them. The
defendants exist in parity to the extent that the moral obligation to apply Lesser
Mercy applies to both of them. This is not equality of results, but substantive
equality, which puts all defendants on a level playing field in terms of the nature
of the court’s considerations and the chance that the court may be influenced by
the defendant’s distress. In the decision to apply Greater Mercy, which is a
94
Fox, supra note 17, at 6 (relating to this argument with a historical example of from 18th-century
England, where pardons were used liberally to prevent harsh sentencing, but the use of mercy as a tool for
lightening the excessive cruelty of the law was often wielded capriciously and discriminatorily to secure interests
of oppression and paternalism); Muller, supra note 13, at 307–12 (arguing that mercy must be defined as an
emotional inclination or approach, and not as a simple act, because an act of compassion could mask repressive
and self-interested motives).
95
See Ward, supra note 80, at 167.
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particular leniency towards the defendant as a residual step, judges grant the
defendant leniency beyond the letter of the law, not arbitrarily, but for reasons
of human sensitivity in the specific case. A step such as this can find support in
moral considerations which are no less valuable than the call to equality, such
as that which practically manifests as the call for law enforcement and just
retribution.
Second, the claim of arbitrariness singles out mercy as an optional
consideration to be applied with judicial discretion, such as may produce
different results in similar cases. However, judicial rulings through and through,
and particularly at the stage of sentencing, are based on many considerations and
factors of various weights and applications. In this framework, uniformity of
punishment is only one of many considerations, making it impossible to
assiduously demand parity of results.
This reflects a wider dilemma: equality, consistency, certainty, security and
the rule of law in criminal enforcement, on the one hand, exist in conflict with
the recognition of human discretion and individuation of punishment, on the
other.96 Of course, this is not to suggest that equality is not a consideration of
paramount importance to the legitimacy of any legal system. However, one must
recognize that the ideal of equality cannot be absolute in any system which
recognizes the principle of individual of sentencing (and, for our purposes,
humanity and compassion as well), in light of the inherent difficulty of applying
generalization of punishment to a complex reality, and the often unanticipated
and unique circumstances this invites. The element of luck is not unique to the
issue of mercy but is found in every stage of the criminal proceedings.
It is easy to illustrate that absolute equality in criminal proceedings is not
attainable. The enforcement of justice, in a real-life setting, must have unequal
results. Equality does not exist in the context of circumstantial luck, which is
related closely in many cases to the point at which the person commits a crime;
equality does not exist on account of the relatively small percentage of offenders
who are caught and prosecuted, while others escape; equality does not exist in
terms of a defendant’s chances of acquittal (affected by uncontrollable factors,
some of them human); equality does not even exist in the framework of the wide
discretion of the court to weigh conventional factors in sentencing. Nevertheless,
this does not indicate a failure of the system.
That we cannot, even in principle, ever attain a complete equality in
the law, with its chilling connotations of implacable justice, does not
96

See generally Muller, supra note 13.
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mean that the system has failed. On the contrary, individuality, both in
society and law, is one of the noblest of human goals.97

Finally, our third rebuttal consists of the argument that, in a system which
endorses great judicial discretion, there is no compelling reason to deny an act
of leniency out of mercy simply on account of its inequality, when no similar
outcry is heard in respect of inequality throughout the process that may lead to
greater stringency (whether it is due to the judge’s distaste for the offender,
sympathy for the victim, or desire to promote stricter penalties as a matter of
general precedent). Courts do not hesitate to write explicit justifications based
on considerations such as these, which impinge on equality as much as any act
of grace. Thus, it is our belief that the fact that the defendant cannot demand a
verdict “beyond the letter of the law” is not a sufficient reason to dismiss the
option of the system’s empowerment to respond, under appropriate
circumstances, to the request to be thus considered. This response does no
injustice towards any other individual sentenced on more purely retributive
grounds.
D. The Argument of the Source of Authority
This argument does not concern the question of whether there is a right to
act with mercy, but rather, who possesses this right. This argument stresses the
responsibility that the judge must assume by accepting appointment (or standing
for election, as the case may be), which defines the boundaries of discretion.
According to this approach, the role of the judge is to enforce the rule of law and
justice,98 which is defined in reference to the legalistic ideal.99 This approach is
expressed by Twambley:
Mercy, properly understood, has no essential connection with
punishment. It is not the prerogative of a judge, on the contrary, a judge
has no right to be merciful. In accepting his office, a judge places
himself under an obligation to impose just sentences and to treat like
cases alike . . .
To repeat: Judges have no right to be merciful because it is not to them
that any obligation is due.100

97
98
99
100

Weinstein, supra note 65, at 822.
Murphy, supra note 5, at 167–68.
Fox, supra note 17, at 7.
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Murphy explains this claim in terms of the paradigmatic place of mercy in civil
law.101 In civil proceedings, the plaintiff does not have an institutional role, but
represents their own particular interests. There is no preliminary duty to apply
the principles of the law in a harsh way, and it is the plaintiff’s rights alone to
do so. Therefore, choosing mercy means waiving a right, this does not violate
the principles of justice.102 The status of the judge, on the other hand, is totally
different. The oath upon appointment is never to deviate from the duty to realize
the rule of law for the sake of a personal inclination, such as love or
compassion.103
In methodological terms, it is correct that one should distinguish between
the morality of mercy generally, and the institutional question of the court
invoking mercy in a criminal verdict. The characterization of mercy as a positive
and desirable trait in regular circumstances, such as in the context of
interpersonal relations, will not necessarily bring us to the conclusion that the
court, as a governmental arm, should choose mercy.104 However, it should be
noted that in the framework of criminal proceedings, the needfulness of mercy
is not unique to the courts. Similar questions may arise in terms of the discretion
of the prosecution as to whether to indict, just as the indictment can be quashed,
and in terms of the sentencing recommendation. This is clear in the context of
granting pardons as well. If it is indeed good and desirable to employ mercy,
why should we forbid this prerogative to judges specifically, and not for other
institutional operators?
In order to examine the force and strength of this argument, we must
examine a wider prerequisite question: What is the moral and social obligation
of the judge? There is no doubt that the judge fills a role for the sake of the
community and acts in its name. They are a representative, not an independent
or private agent, and the role requires the fulfillment of the duties entrusted to
them by the citizenry. But what precisely are the judge’s duties?
The argument that the employment of mercy annuls the agency of the judge
and is considered a departure from their authority begs the question of whether
this is not an unduly narrow interpretation of the judge’s mission, scope, and
101

Murphy, supra note 5, at 174–76.
An additional argument is that employing mercy is an act of forgiveness, and the judge is not allowed
to forgive in the name of the victims. While we acknowledge the parallel between mercy and forgiveness, but
see supra, Section I(I), one may instead respond that, in the criminal context, forgiveness or leniency are
societally motivated, and that this should not be confused with forgiveness in the place or name of the victims.
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Murphy, supra note 5, at 176–78,
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purpose.105 If normatively speaking, mercy in sentencing is a virtue—and to this
point much of our analysis henceforth has been devoted—there is no reason for
the judges not to see themselves authorized to do so in the name of the society.
It bears repeating, once more, that mercy should not be identified with
forgiveness.
This Article argues that the mission, responsibility and role of the judge, as
a representative of society, include protecting and advancing values beyond
retribution in sentencing. The authority to choose grace and mercy is inherent,
and lives in harmony with our moral expectations of the judge. The judge is not
a legal technician. Their role is to apply simultaneously the rule of law and the
human function of adjudication, both of which is integral. The judge, as society’s
representative, must give response and expression to the need for sensitivity and
balance towards offenders, who are part of the society on whose behalf the court
acts. Judges represent a yearning for human justice, not a justice which is
mechanistic and devoid of emotions. As such, the judge is the natural address
for an offender expressing regret and seeking mercy.
All who stands before the judges see them as representing society, the values
and characteristics of the law of the state. They need not be seen as representing
legalistic principles only, not least when we recognize the moral importance of
the presentation of the human values of compassion and understanding and
responding to the distress of the offender. The residual authority of a judge to
act beyond the letter of the law is not presumptuous or a breach of mission. In
pronouncing judgment, the judge also has fiduciary duties to the defendant. The
judge has no duty to sweeten punishment on the basis of mercy, but they do have
a duty not to be closed off to a sense of moderation under appropriate
circumstances, allowing them the freedom to limit a penalty which seems
unnecessary or unduly destructive.
E. The Emotional Argument
The view that negates the place of mercy in the criminal justice process tends
to see judging and sentencing as processes based on rational considerations and
parameters, wherein no emotion should find expression.106 Mercy is described
often as an unrestrained act of compassion based on sentiment,107 indicating a
lack of discipline. The court is forbidden to be “weakly merciful[.]”108 Emotion
105
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Thanks to Professor David Enoch for pointing this out.
See also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (P.H. Nidditch ed. 1978).
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is understood as a display of weakness when the law calls upon the court to
demonstrate its full strength, and thus “a product of morally dangerous
sentimentality.”109
The challenge posed by this argument is straightforward, and so is the
question that it raises: What is the place, if any, of emotion in punishment,
alongside logic? Do we strive for a sentence born of a purely analytical
viewpoint, or should the justice system demonstrate a greater openness to human
considerations and possess the capacity to reveal empathy and compassion
towards those who enter it? These questions relate to the virtues of mercy and
the restorative function it performs. These issues arouse a debate not only in
relation to a certain type of act, but also in relation to the question of what the
desirable qualities of a moral justice system and its judges are.
In this regard this Article relies, inter alia, on Jerome Frank, who argues that
emotion has a place in law; that after all is said and done, a judge is human,
influenced by the inclinations of the heart to reveal empathy and
identification.110 The true question is not whether emotion influences judges, but
whether it must be shrouded behind a screen of legalistic neutrality and
objectivity:
Rules we must have. They set limits to the discretion vested in our
judges, but limits which, in many instances, can be imposed only by
the judges themselves. The rules are a sort of legal machinery. But
legal machinery will not suffice. The men who operate that machinery
must be men keenly alive to their immense responsibilities to the
citizens. We could not, if we would, get rid of emotions in the
administration of justice. The best we can hope for is that the emotions
of the trial judge will be sensitive, nicely balanced, subject to his own
scrutiny. The honest, well-trained trial judge, with the completest
possible knowledge of the character of his powers and of his own
prejudices and weaknesses, is the best guaranty of justice. The wise
course is to acknowledge the necessary existence of ‘personal element’
and to act accordingly.111

This view relates to all the aspects of the judicial process, including fact-finding,
and gains further importance at sentencing. Like Professor Martha Nussbaum,112
this Article does not argue for the integration of emotion and compassion in
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Murphy, supra note 5, at 167 (emphasis added).
FRANK, supra note 1, at 411–12.
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judgment as an evil to be avoided, but as an essential component facilitating the
judge’s moral choice.
Moreover, using Portia’s speech, Shakespeare teaches us an additional
aspect of mercy, which is not focused on the implications for the beneficiary,
but rather, the giver. There is a substantial connection between mercy and
characteristics of the giver:
The quality of mercy is not strained./ It droppeth as the gentle rain
from heaven/ Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:/ It blesseth him
that gives and him that takes./ ‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest. It
becomes/ The thronèd monarch better than his crown,/ His sceptre
shows the force of temporal power,/ The attribute to awe and majesty,/
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings,/ But mercy is above this
sceptred sway./ It is enthroned in the hearts of kings./ It is an attribute
to God himself.113

This is important for understanding the nature of mercy. Mercy, precisely
because it is not inscribed in any book and is not limited to formal discourse of
rights, is a measure which results from maturity of character. Mercy is not just
an act of moderation and balance; it expresses also mental aspects of moderation
and balance. More than an act of emotion, humanity and compassion, it is the
ability to personally express emotion, humanity and compassion.
While the arguments of those who deny mercy underscore the ideal legalistic
view of justice and the rule of law as the key features of the legal system, the
argument in praise of mercy in law states that additional features, humane and
moderating features, are required, especially when considering the imposition of
severe sanctions upon individuals in society.
What are the qualities and types of perspective expressed in mercy? They
indicate the modesty and humility of a giving heart. They express the willingness
to relinquish and to take risks.114
These elements of the deliberative process in justice stand in direct and sharp
opposition to the arrogance, defensiveness, excessive severity and pettiness
which sometimes characterize the law.115 They restrain the spirit of anger and
vengeance. They reflect moderation, the ability to cope, and restraint. So, when
characterizing compassion as an emotion that may arise in the heart of the judge,
it is important to carefully consider the implications of an absolute imperative to
113
114
115
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suppress emotion. The intuitive tendency of people to attribute positive value to
the concept of mercy and to see it as a desirable capacity is no random
inclination. Mercy is seen as a touchstone, a state of mind which prevents
insensitivity that might, even eventually mature into cruelty. Mercy reflects the
understanding—both in relation to the criminal and in relation to the judge—
that we are dealing with human beings.116
When discussing compassion, one must grapple with the question of the
moral character of the judiciary and the spiritual trends that society is ready to
express in the area of criminal justice and criminal punishment. The discussion
of such values is vitally important for us as much as a discussion of deontological
concepts.
F. The Antinomian Argument—The Inapplicability of a Moral Imperative to
Emotional Reactions
This criticism relates to Lesser Mercy. Statman argues that the moral duties
should be definable without reference to the question of motivation, thus, mercy
requires acting less harshly than usual, whatever the motive.117 This argument is
an expression of the antinomian thesis, whereby it is impossible to demand a
state of mind or emotion. This can be expressed both as a principled objection
to a duty to express emotions, and a practical objection to its very possibility.
The principle question concerns whether moral value can be attributed to an
intent or emotion at all. In practical terms, the question is whether a person is
capable, even if willing, to bring themselves to experience emotions that do not
arise in their heart.
There are two possible answers to this claim. One approach does indeed
assign a certain moral value to intentions, aims, and moral exertion, even
mandating them. The imperative is directed to the mind and consists of an
expectation that the judge will invest a moral and mental effort at introspection.
This stems from seeing the work of the law, judgment and punishment as not a
purely rational labor.
A second response to this claim is that one may distinguish between the state
of mind and emotion itself, and the judgment of the material world that is derived
of that state of mind or emotion.118 It is important that the judge consider the
suffering of the defendant and their relatives, determine if the amount of
116
117
118
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suffering as a result of the judicial proceeding is appropriate, and attempt to
understand the defendant’s distress and show openness to this perspective. The
judge is not required to identify with the defendant or experience the emotion of
compassion, as this may be out of their control. However, they are required to
incorporate this perspective as an important and exigent part of the deliberation
process. We are contemplating an obligation of the court to avail itself of the
normative assumptions and judgments that underlie compassion. The awakening
of compassion as a result cannot be commanded, thus distinguishing this
application of mercy from an integral part of justice.
G. The Argument of Undermining the Principle of Guilt
Another argument presented by critics is that mercy undermines not only
justice in the abstract, but, even more so, the principle of guilt. Mercy, it is
argued, releases the offender from moral accountability.119 Mercy undermines
formal justice, which reflects the retributive belief in man’s moral responsibility
for his crimes.120 Grace in this context dissolves the very fiber of
responsibility.121
In response, this Article must pose the question of whether mercy
undermines responsibility, and if so, to what extent. We should not necessarily
identify the readiness to take account of the defendant and to be lenient therewith
in light of the existence of specific circumstances, or even to deal therewith
beyond the letter of the law in a time of need, with doubts as to the validity of
conviction and finding of responsibility. Mercy, in the sense of compassion and
grace, does not contradict the concept of responsibility, and in some cases may
even strengthen it. It expresses the ability of society to show restraint and
forbearance, rather than a moral stance concerning the criminal act. This is
provided that mercy must be expressed openly and explicitly in sentencing
considerations, so as not to conceal or disguise its mitigating activity.
The claim of impinging on the principle of guilt is relevant specifically when
considerations of mercy act in a disguised manner, and without an explicit
indication that the relatively light sentence is due to the decision to treat the
defendant beyond the letter of the law owing to special circumstances. The
integration of mercy as a legitimate, visible, and explicit factor may, conversely,
prevent the misconception feared here from emerging. Indeed, our approach
might often express the nature of judicial discretion as applied in adjudication
119
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and sentencing more accurately and sincerely than prevailing attitudes would
have it.
In any event, this Article notes above that the potentially dualist nature of
the relationship between mercy and justice in this regard should not necessarily
be perceived as a flaw. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with prosecution and
punishment that express a two-fold message: one in accordance with the letter
of the law, and one beyond the letter of the law; a message of retribution with
mitigating considerations; a message of responsibility along with the recognition
of others’ hardships and the acknowledgment that man is not in complete control
of his circumstances; and a message of determining liability alongside a
willingness to relinquish and restrain. Not only is such duality not unacceptable,
but sometimes it is even essential.
H. The Consequential Argument
The consequential argument focuses on the alleged implication of
integrating mercy into the legal system as a whole. The consequential argument
applies not only to fear of the possible damage to the power and message of
punishment in a particular case or sequence of events, but also fear of the
systemic nullification of law.122 The argument is that a legal system that
accommodates the consideration of mercy as a legitimate consideration will
ultimately breed chaos and disorder.123
Addressing this argument demands that this Article clarifies the function
mercy fulfills in a system of law based on order, security and considerations of
retribution. This Article must examine the moral and cultural context of
integrating mercy into such a system, and whether, in the framework of the
relationship between mercy and justice, leniently towards the offender beyond
the strict letter of the law does indeed pose a challenge to the rule of law, leading
(conceptually) to disorder and chaos.
This Article argues that the relationship can be described differently. The
synergy of mercy and law together, where the integration of the former is
necessary and desirable, may in fact contribute to the strengthening of those
same societal goals that the legal process is designed to promote. This question,
as noted above, has an abstract and even a spiritual dimension. Mercy, the
readiness to forbear and not be entrapped by negative emotions, transmits power.
Overcoming anger, vengeance and other negative emotions is an expression of
122
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power. The hero “conquers his temptation.”124 This contributes to strengthening
social values, such as mutual support and hope for a better future. It is our belief
that the argument that the integration of mercy and judgment would bring about
the systematic nullification of law, giving way to chaos, stems from the fear of
excessive use of mercy in the judicial process.
Finally, this Article finds little support for the alternative assumption that an
approach applying only simple retribution always impacts positively upon
society. One may argue that the opposite is sometimes true. On the other hand,
a verdict which broadcasts a message of compassion, consideration, conciliation
and willingness to relent, where applicable, may be essential for the existence of
normal community life, and certainly no less so than a verdict adhering to the
petty attitude of “let the law drill through the mountain.” This is the foundation
of a sustainable society.
I. The Argument of Compassion for the Victims
One of the arguments in popular literature against the integration of mercy
in the judicial process, especially in contemporary times, focuses on the object
of compassion and sympathy. Instead of empathy for the offender, their children
or their family, many argue that empathy is required specifically for the victims,
who have been caused suffering, to society, and to potential future victims in
need of protection by the legal system. This claim is very popular and can be
found in legal rulings,125 though it does not appear often in academic literature.
One can interpret this in utilitarian terms of crime deterrence and sparing the
suffering of future victims suffering. It can also be couched in terms of
retribution, giving fitting expression to the suffering of the victims. Supporters
of this argument tend to associate compassion towards the offender with further
injury to the victims.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to enter the discussion of whether and
to what extent criminal punishment must be influenced by the victim’s position.
In principle, the current trend that can be seen in some countries’ legal
systems,126 granting increased weight to the position of the victims (both
directly, by providing tools for the description and illustration of the distress and
suffering caused to them before the court, and indirectly, by providing more
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significant weight to these considerations in sentencing) is a laudable one.
Indeed, this trend only reinforces the vitality of mercy as a mitigating concern.
It is doubtful whether an argument for the importance of identification with
the suffering of the victims is indeed opposed to an argument for mercy in
adjudication and sentencing, at least in the sense advocated in this Article.127
Presumably, in most relevant cases, the suffering of the victims and the
protection of potential victims are already presupposed at the stage of
sentencing. Criminal law, from start to finish, necessarily presents the defendant
as an object for denunciation. It presents a narrative of harm, danger and threat.
When the court arrives at the stage of sentencing, it is equipped with the
guidelines of the law, applying punitive retribution corresponding to the wrong
of the defendant’s actions, and with the express intent of redressing the suffering
caused. In our current judicial reality, the court is also equipped with details
about the degree of suffering of the victim, and a public tailwind encourages
harsh punishment. The nature of criminal law emphasizes the perspective of the
victims and society, to the extent that the degree of punishment is sometimes
decided based only on this consideration.
The incorporation of the two senses of mercy in criminal proceedings does
not stand in conflict to any feeling of empathy towards the victims, nor
sensitivity to their distress and suffering. Rather, as a strong emphasis is placed
on the suffering of the victims in sentencing by default, Lesser Mercy instead
serves as an important counterweight.128 It guarantees that judicial deliberation
will not let considerations of judicial identification with the victim or
considerations relating to the danger posed to society blind the judge to other
relevant perspectives. The implementation of mercy in criminal proceedings
allows for a more nuanced approach to justice by requiring the inclusion of
additional normative presuppositions.

127
Actually, in some certain cases, it seems like those two principles might guide us to the same end result.
See, e.g., CrimA 5855/15 Lugassi v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (June 5, 2016) (Isr.). The circumstances
of the case were exceptional. The Appellant was convicted for the offense manslaughter and the victim was his
own brother. Id. The brothers’ mother seeks to reduce her son’s punishment and treat him with the degree of
mercy, which will alleviate even a little of the family’s terrible pain. Id. Although the public interest requiring
adequate punishment of the appellant, for his grievous acts and their consequences, the degree of mercy in the
circumstances of the case cannot be ignored. The court addressed the pain of the victim’s mother seeking to
reduce her son’s punishment and treat him with mercy so as to alleviate the family’s pain. Accordingly, and
while the court exercised the degree of mercy, the appellant’s sentence was reduced.
128
In that manner, it should be noted, that more than once, the Israeli courts have discussed this issue,
mercy’s application in criminal law. See, e.g., CrimA 6672/03 Kaminsky v. State of Israel, Nevo Legal Database
(Dec. 25, 2003) (Isr.). There, Justice Tirkel has ruled that there the appellants’ actions and crimes has illustrated
that they had no mercy, and therefore, the court should not apply mercy on the merciless. Id.
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As for Greater Mercy as a residual prerogative, it must not be mistakenly
construed to advocate a general policy or default, but rather, the possibility of
judging beyond the letter of the law in light of unique circumstances.
If, after taking into account the totality of the circumstances, and after
attempting to view the offense and sentence from the perspective of the
defendant, the court nonetheless remains convinced that there is good reason for
severity, due to the condition of the victim or by identification of a danger to
society. This Article does not presume to deny such an option. Indeed, this is
likely the reality of most cases. This Article merely posits the right of the reverse
possibility to consideration: The possibility to conclude that, under unique
circumstances—perhaps in light of the offender’s particular suffering or
remorse—it is appropriate to make an exception, and to devise a sentence with
mercy in mind.
J. The Argument of Human Pride and Dignity
The final argument is that, notwithstanding the distinction that was drawn
above between mercy and pity, mercy towards the offender contains an element
of condescendence. Punishing a person retributively is the one way to express
respect for their rationality and autonomy. Conversely, exhibiting mercy
towards the offender is an expression to the power of the judicial system, and,
conversely, contempt for the defendant.
This argument can be attacked in several ways. First, it is unlikely that many
defendants would stand before the court at sentencing and urge the law to punish
them retributively, with no degree of mercy, as if this somehow preserves their
dignity. Second, severe punishment, such as imprisonment for many years, in
itself represents a significant blow to the dignity of the convict. Third, there is
also the possibility of error at the point of conviction to consider. Fourth, every
institution with strength and power in its hands must know how to curb that
power. Finally, this argument is inherently paternalistic, to presume to dictate to
subjects that a course of action that expressly contravenes their interests is
somehow necessary to protect their dignity.
But beyond all of these arguments, the true problem lies in the identification
of the argument for judicial leniency with arrogance and contempt. Mercy,
although it transmits power and the ability to forbear, may express a positive
message which validates the autonomy of the individual by recognizing their
ability to mature, and to acknowledge and defer to this ability. When identifying
a person’s failure in light of stress or difficult circumstances, adopting the
perspective that they present through their pleadings and accepting their special
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request for leniency on the basis of trust in their rational ability to reform their
ways can only be made possible through acknowledgment and respect for their
autonomy.
K. Summation of Critical Analyses
In light of the foregoing, our thesis is not primarily a rational response to
direct complaints against the recognition of the place of mercy in sentencing.
Rather, it is first and foremost an argument in favor of the adoption of a different
approach towards the nature of the work of the judiciary and the qualities judges
should express in their work. While some see the sentencing parameters as
rigidly fixed in a framework of clear duties, this Article assert herein that such
an approach is as unrealistic and incomplete as it is uncompromising. Criminal
sentencing cannot be confined to the discourse of retribution, from which any
deviation is injustice. Moral judgment is not in thrall to generalized categories,
emotions, such as recognition for the suffering of others and the discovery of
empathy, are not foreign to it. Qualities of sensitivity, balance and moderation
may complete justice when it veers towards unsettling results. Recognizing that
justice, retribution, and responsibility are not absolute terms, as well as the limits
of the judicial mandate to judge others, leaves an important place for balancing
and mitigating the stringent sentencing considerations that often dominate
sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Criminal justice is the ultimate tool provided by society to protect itself
against delinquency. It is unique and costly. It allows for the state to visit
significant harm to its subjects’ liberty and rights. The impact of its edicts may
be difficult, painful, destructive, and irreversible. Criminal justice is an arena
wherein society, through its institutions, are mobilized against the individual.
Often, the defendant emerges from criminal proceedings bruised and humiliated,
regardless of their formal outcome.
At the stage of the delivery of the verdict and of sentencing, the first and
foremost consideration before the court is to protect society. This is closely
pursued by considerations of retribution, redressing victims’ grievances,
deterring other criminals, and giving expression to the public’s normative
sentiments. These considerations necessarily pull in the direction of harsh
punishment.
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This Article has analyzed and advocated the importance of mercy in
sentencing. Furthermore, this Article has defined the purpose of mercy as a
factor that can serve to moderate more central considerations, and their implicit
tendencies toward stringency. Mercy is founded on the basis of observation and
attention to the plight of the accused. The stage of the delivery of the verdict and
sentencing combined form the defendant’s day of reckoning. Their fate hanging
in the balance. An argument for compassion is actually a case for the importance
of attending to all relevant considerations, without foregoing the perspective of
the defendant and others affected collaterally. An argument for mercy is based
on its conceptualization as a factor complementing justice and moderating the
injury of the sentence when applicable.
Ultimately, the issue of the status of mercy in judgment and punishment
confronts us with a fundamental question: What are the values and virtues of
society, and the judges acting in its name? As argued herein, the answer to this
question must account for the essential degree of willingness to express
sensitivity, human compassion, and recognition of the necessity and morality of
grace.

